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1. THE WILLIAMS INSTITUTE, UNITED STATES CENSUS SNAPSHOT: 2010, available at http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Census2010SnapshotUS-v2.pdf (last visited May 10, 2013).
2. Id.
3. See Chatterjee v. King, 2012-NMSC-019, 280 P.3d 283.
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The 2010 U.S. Census reports that nearly 650,000 same-sex couples
live in the United States and, among those, 17 percent are raising children
in their homes.1 In New Mexico alone, there are nearly 6,000 same-sex
couples, approximately seven same-sex couples per every 1,000 households.2 Without a dissolution of marriage act applicable to same-sex partnerships, the application of New Mexico’s Uniform Parentage Act (UPA)
to custodial disputes becomes extremely important to presumed parents
and children within a same-sex household. The pressing issue in child custody cases is whether same-sex partners who have lived together and
have brought children into the relationship have the right to continue to
parent those children following the dissolution of their relationship.
The New Mexico Supreme Court’s opinion in Chatterjee v. King
(Chatterjee) addresses the tension in applying the UPA to same-sex family custody disputes.3 This case note explores the way in which the New
Mexico Supreme Court broadened the definition of “parent” under the
UPA to include same-sex partners and the impact the decision may have
on New Mexican families. Section II explains the development of the
common-law approach to custody and the creation of the UPA. Section
III discusses the issues raised in Chatterjee regarding standing in same-sex
partner custody cases, in light of the court’s gender-neutral approach to
defining parents under the UPA. Last, Section IV examines the constitu-
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tional issues and policy considerations raised in Chatterjee and argues that
substantive due process, equal protection, and legislative intent of the
UPA require the court’s gender-neutral approach to defining parents
under the UPA; the section also briefly addresses the implications of
Chatterjee for the New Mexico bar.
II. BACKGROUND
At English common law, the marital relationship of a child’s parents
at the child’s birth or conception determined the child’s legal relationship
to his or her parents.4 A child was considered “legitimate” only if the
parents were married at the time of conception or birth; absent these
facts, the child was deemed “illegitimate.”5 The law did not recognize the
relationship of non-marital children to either biological parent, nor did it
recognize them as part of any familial relationship.6 Not until the late
nineteenth century did states begin to recognize that illegitimate children
were part of their mother’s family.7 However, under this framework, slave
children or children of a white male and black female were still illegitimate because miscegenation was illegal and the child derived his or her
social status from the mother—a slave.8
Illegitimate children had no legal rights.9 For example, illegitimate
children could not inherit from their fathers or bring actions for their
fathers’ wrongful death, and they were ineligible to acquire benefits as a
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4. See Lord Mansfield’s Rule, expounded in Goodright v. Moss, (1777) 98 Eng.
Rep. 1257 (K.B.) 1258; 2 Cowp. 591, 593, which stated that “it is a rule, founded in
decency, morality, and policy, that [the spouses] . . . shall not be permitted to say after marriage, that they have had no connection, and therefore that the offspring is
spurious . . . .” See also Uniform Parentage Act Summary, NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS
ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, http://uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Parentage%20
Act (last visited May 29, 2013) [hereinafter NCCUSL].
5. The parents of a legitimate child must be married to each other at the time of
the child’s birth or the child must be born within the gestational period after the
marriage ends. The marriage must be or must have been a lawful marriage. At common law (and in the modern era), there remains a strong presumption in the law that
a child born to a married woman is the child of the woman’s husband. In the past, this
presumption was very difficult to overcome. See HARRY D. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY:
LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 10–17 (1971); NCCUSL, supra note 4.
6. DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS ET AL., CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW 278 (2006).
7. Id. at 279.
8. Id. (“If both parents were slaves, their offspring were illegitimate, since marriage between slaves was not legally binding. It is likely that black fathers had no
parental rights over their offspring, as they could do nothing when their ‘wives’ were
beaten and raped by white men.”).
9. See KRAUSE, supra note 5, at 10–17; NCCUSL, supra note 4.
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result of not having a legally defined father.10 Fathers were neither saddled with the obligations of parenting nor granted prospects of custody,
visitation, or adoption.11 Illegitimate children had no right to parental
support, and unmarried fathers had no rights to custody.12 Despite these
harsh effects, society and the law long upheld this system on policy
grounds rooted in traditional notions of morality and fidelity.13
A. The Model Uniform Parentage Act
Through a series of cases in the 1960s and 1970s, the U.S. Supreme
Court eliminated the common-law notion of illegitimacy.14 In 1973, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) approved the first version of the UPA.15 The original purpose of
the act was to create uniformity in the law concerning children born out
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10. See KRAUSE, supra note 5, at 10–17 (1971); NCCUSL, supra note 4.
11. See NCCUSL, supra note 4; Harry D. Krause, Bringing the Bastard into the
Great Society: A Proposed Uniform Act of Legitimacy, 44 TEX. L. REV. 829, 857
(1966).
12. NCCUSL, supra note 4.
13. Laurence C. Nolan, “Unwed Children” and Their Parents Before the United
States Supreme Court from Levy to Michael H.: Unlikely Participants in Constitutional
Jurisprudence, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 1, 6 (1999); ABRAMS, supra note 6, at 278; Susan F.
Appleton, Illegitimacy and Sex, Old and New, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L.
347, 350–51 (2011/2012) (“Illegitimacy has always, by design, operated as a means of
regulating sex and, in turn, conveying a moral message about sex. It has accomplished
these objectives in several ways. First, illegitimacy has served family law’s ‘channeling
function,’ seeking to confine sexual activity within marriage by creating a disfavored
status for children conceived and born outside marriage. Second, its doctrinal and
evidentiary supports—such as the presumption of legitimacy and Lord Mansfield’s
Rule—have covered up illicit sex, by treating a married woman’s offspring as the
children of her husband, even when he is not the genetic father. Illegitimacy has long
made marital sex normative and everything else second-class at best and deviant at
worst.”).
14. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (holding that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment entitles unwed fathers to hearings on parental
fitness before a child could be taken from that father in dependency proceeding after
the death of the child’s natural mother); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 406 U.S.
164 (1972) (holding that Louisiana workers’ compensation statutes denying equal recovery rights to illegitimate children violated equal protection clause); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (holding that illegitimate children had the right to recover for
wrongful death of the parent of the legitimate child had the same right); Glona v. Am.
Guar. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968) (holding that states cannot deny parents of an illegitimate child the right to bring a tort action for wrongful death of the child if the parent
of a legitimate child had the same right).
15. NCCUSL, supra note 4.
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of wedlock.16 Consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court rulings, the first
Model UPA sought to address unequal treatment of illegitimate children
in child support and inheritance disputes.17 In 2002, the NCCUSL substantially revised the UPA to account for the impact of advances in genetic testing, surrogacy, and in-vitro fertilization on parentage law.18 The
Model UPA discarded the common-law notion of an illegitimate child by
replacing an inquiry focused on marital status with one evaluating the
parent-child relationship.19 The Model UPA shifted custodial and parentage rights into a modern era.20
B. The New Mexico UPA
The UPA allows men and women who are not biologically related to
a child to acknowledge their parental status before or upon the birth of a
child.21 Initially, New Mexico’s UPA provided a method to declare the
existence of a mother and child relationship that stated: “Any interested
party may bring an action to determine the existence or nonexistence of a
mother and child relationship. Insofar as practicable, the provisions of the
[UPA] applicable to the father and child relationship apply.”22 Section 4011-2 of the UPA stated:
[P]arent and child relationship means the legal relationship existing between a child and his natural or adoptive parents incident
to which the law confers or imposes rights, privileges, duties and
obligations. It includes the mother and child relationship and the
father and child relationship.23
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16. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 2 cmt. (1973) (amended 2000), 9B U.L.A. 390
(2001).
17. See NCCUSL, supra note 4; Smith v. Gordon, 968 A.2d 1, 9 (Del. 2009), superseded by statute, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201 (2010), as recognized in Smith v.
Guest, 16 A.3d 920 (2011).
18. NCCUSL, supra note 4. See also ABRAMS, supra note 6, at 278.
19. “The parent and child relationship extends equally to every child and to every
parent, regardless of the parents’ marital status.” UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 2 (1973)
(amended 2000), 9B U.L.A. 390 (2001). See Smith v. Gordon, 968 A.2d 1, 9 (Del.
2009).
20. See NCCUSL, supra note 4.
21. NMSA 1978, § 40-11A-201 (2010).
22. Uniform Parentage Act, NMSA 1978, § 40-11-2 (2004), repealed by Laws
2009, ch. 215, § 19, effective January 1, 2010; recodified as New Mexico Uniform Parentage Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 40-11A-101 to 903 (2010)). The provision of UPA allowing an “interested party” to bring an action to determine the existence of a
“parent and child relationship” and addressing the father-child relationship was removed from the recodified UPA. However, parent-child relationships have been
broadened under Section 40-11A-201.
23. Chatterjee v. King, 2012-NMSC-019, ¶ 13, 280 P.3d 283, 287.
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For a mother, Section 40-11-4(A) provided that a natural mother may be
established by proof of her having given birth to the child, or as provided
by Section 40-11-21.24 Section 40-11-5(A)(4) provides, in relevant part,
that:
[A] man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if . . . while
the child is under the age of majority, he openly holds out the
child as his natural child and has established a personal, financial
or custodial relationship with the child.25

Unlike parent-child relationships defined under common-law notions of
legitimacy, the UPA confers duties, rights, privileges, and obligations to
both natural and adoptive parents. As a result, the primary purpose of
determining parentage under the UPA is to provide support for the
child.26
Prior to Chatterjee, New Mexico courts had never examined the
meaning of the phrase “existence of parent-child relationship” under the
UPA for same-sex couples. There has never been a UPA provision specifically allowing a non-biological mother to secure parental rights through
anything other than adoption.27 Courts applying the UPA have recognized the existence of legal parent-child relationships in which the father
and child are not biologically related.28 Furthermore, in protecting the
rights of non-biological fathers, the New Mexico Court of Appeals has
stated that it is “aware of no constitutional doctrine that insists on a genetic basis for parenthood.”29 By acknowledging the parentage of nonbiological fathers, New Mexico courts have already taken an expansive
view of the parent and child relationship as defined under Section 4011A-201 of the UPA.30 Prior to Chatterjee, that law granted non-biological
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C M
Y K

33613-nmx_43-2 Sheet No. 110 Side A

24. Chatterjee, 2012-NMSC-019, ¶ 13, 280 P.3d 283, 287.
25. Id. ¶ 15, 280 P.3d at 287-88.
26. See Padilla v. Montano, 116 N.M. 398, 401, 862 P.2d 1257, 1260 (Ct. App.
1993).
27. Chatterjee, 2012-NMSC-019, ¶ 7, 280 P.3d 283, 286.
28. Tedford v. Gregory, 1998-NMCA-067, ¶ 15, 959 P.2d 540, 545 (The court foreshadowed a broader parent-child relationship: “[T]he court will not determine paternity solely on the basis of a biological relationship between the child and the putative
father.”).
29. Lane v. Lane, 1996-NMCA-023, ¶ 16, 912 P.2d 290, 294.
30. NMSA 1978, § 40-11A-201 (2010). Prior to 2009 recodification of UPA, courts
interpreted “Establishment of parent-child relationship[s]” under NMSA 1978, Section 40-11-2 (1986) (defining the parent and child relationship as “the legal relationship existing between a child and his natural or adoptive parents incident to which the
law confers or imposes rights, privileges, duties and obligations. It includes the mother
and child relationship and the father and child relationship.”).
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fathers the same rights as natural and adoptive parents.31 Chatterjee extended these holdings to apply to presumptive same-sex parents, permitting the New Mexico UPA to remain consistent with the Model UPA’s
ultimate legislative intent: eliminating the harsh effects the English common law imposed on children born out of wedlock.32 The following section addresses the issues presented in Chatterjee and how the court
analyzed the parent and child relationship under New Mexico’s UPA.
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Chatterjee discusses whether a same-sex parent has standing to assert a custody claim under the UPA.33 The following subsections discuss
the pertinent facts of Chatterjee, the procedural history, the analysis of
the majority opinion, and a summary of the concurring opinion.
A. Facts

C M
Y K
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31. Lane, 1996-NMCA-023, ¶ 16, 912 P.2d 290, 294.
32. Chatterjee, 2012-NMSC-019, 280 P.3d 283.
33. Id. ¶ 4, 280 P.3d at 285; Chatterjee v. King, 2011-NMCA-012, ¶ 1, 253 P.3d
915, 917.
34. Chatterjee, 2012-NMSC-019, ¶ 1, 280 P.3d 283, 284; Brief for Petitioner at 2,
Chatterjee v. King, 2012-NMSC-019, 280 P.3d 283 (No. 32–789) (Chatterjee and King
lived together in a committed domestic relationship from 1993 to 2008).
35. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Chatterjee, 2012-NMSC-019, 280 P.3d 283.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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Two women, Petitioner Bani Chatterjee and Respondent Taya King,
were in a committed, long-term domestic relationship when they decided
to adopt a child from Russia.34 Chatterjee and King traveled together to
Russia to adopt Alliya in 2000 when she was 13 months old.35 They were
advised that the Russian adoption agency would be disinclined to allow
an adoption by same-sex parents and would also view King’s ethnicity
more favorably than that of Chatterjee.36 As a result, although both Chatterjee and King assumed full parental responsibility for the child, they did
not attempt to adopt the child jointly; King became the sole adoptive
parent.37
Chatterjee and King raised Alliya together for nine years.38 King
encouraged Alliya to love and depend upon Chatterjee, and consequently
Chatterjee and Alliya developed a strong parent-child bond.39 Aware of
having two mothers, Alliya referred to King as “Mom” or “Mommy” and
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Chatterjee as “Mammo.”40 Both parties mutually acknowledged one another as Alliya’s parents and publicly held themselves out as Alliya’s parents.41 Friends of the couple, as well as the director of Alliya’s school,
Alliya’s doctors, and Chatterjee’s colleagues, understood that Chatterjee
and King parented Alliya together.42 King registered Alliya at school with
the last name of “Chatterjee-King,” listed Chatterjee as Alliya’s “other
parent” on school registration documents, and used Chatterjee’s name
and credit card number for Alliya’s tuition payment authorization
forms.43 Chatterjee supported King and Alliya financially by working full
time and allowing King to stay at home with Alliya, covering Alliya under
her health insurance plan, and designating Alliya as the beneficiary of
Chatterjee’s retirement plan.44 Chatterjee also took part in day-to-day parental responsibilities throughout the week, including helping Alliya get
ready for school, volunteering in the classroom, and participating in parent-teacher conferences.45
However, Chatterjee never adopted Alliya, and King and Chatterjee eventually ended their long-term relationship.46 King initially allowed Chatterjee to visit with Alliya but subsequently reduced the
frequency of visits and ultimately terminated them.47 Shortly thereafter,
King moved to Colorado and sought to prevent Chatterjee from having
any contact with Alliya.48
B. Procedural History
On December 24, 2008, Chatterjee filed a petition in district court to
establish parentage and determine custody and timesharing.49 Chatterjee
alleged she was a presumed natural parent under the former codification
of the UPA.50 Chatterjee further claimed to be an acting parent of Alliya

02/11/2014 12:56:22
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40. Id. at 4.
41. Id. at 2–3.
42. Id. at 3.
43. Id. at 3–4.
44. Id. at 4.
45. Id. at 4.
46. Chatterjee v. King, 2012-NMSC-019, ¶ 1, 280 P.3d 283, 284; Chatterjee v.
King, 2011-NMCA-012, ¶ 2, 253 P.3d 915, 918.
47. Chatterjee, 2011-NMCA-012, ¶ 2, 253 P.3d 915, 918.
48. Chatterjee, 2012-NMSC-019, ¶ 1, 280 P.3d 283, 284; Chatterjee, 2011-NMCA012, 253 P.3d 915.
49. Chatterjee, 2012-NMSC-019, ¶ 2, 280 P.3d 283, 284; Brief for Petitioner at 5,
Chatterjee, 2012-NMSC-019, 280 P.3d 283 (No. 32–789).
50. NMSA 1978, § 40-11-3 (1986); NMSA 1978, § 40-11-5 (1997); NMSA 1978,
§ 40-11-21 (1986); Chatterjee, 2012-NMSC-019, ¶ 2, 280 P.3d 283, 284.
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and that she was entitled to relief in order to contribute to the support of
Alliya.51
In response to Chatterjee’s petition, King filed a motion to dismiss.52
In the motion to dismiss, King neither admitted nor denied any of the
facts that Chatterjee claimed in her petition.53 King instead argued that
Chatterjee was a third party seeking custody and visitation of Alliya and
that Section 40-4-9.1(K) of the Dissolution of Marriage Act54 prohibited a
third party from receiving custody rights absent a showing of unfitness of
the natural or adoptive parent.55 On March 11, 2009, the district court
dismissed the petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted.56 Chatterjee appealed; the New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the district court.57
The New Mexico Court of Appeals held that Chatterjee did not
have standing to seek joint custody absent a showing of King’s unfitness
because she was neither the biological nor the adoptive mother of Alliya.58 The court of appeals further held that presumptions establishing a
father and child relationship cannot be applied to women, and a mother
and child relationship can only be established through biology and adoption.59 Judge Vigil, who dissented in the court of appeals opinion, believed
that Chatterjee had standing to pursue joint custody under the extraordinary circumstances doctrine.60 The court of appeals reversed the dismissal
of Chatterjee’s petition and remanded to the district court, instructing the
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51. Chatterjee, 2012-NMSC-019, ¶ 2, 280 P.3d 283, 284; Brief for Petitioner at 5,
Chatterjee, 2012-NMSC-019, 280 P.3d 283.
52. Chatterjee, 2012-NMSC-019, ¶ 2, 280 P.3d 283, 284.
53. Id.
54. “When any person other than a natural or adoptive parent seeks custody of a
child, no such person shall be awarded custody absent a showing of unfitness of the
natural or adoptive parent.” NMSA 1978, §§ 40-4-1 to -20 (2011).
55. Chatterjee, 2012-NMSC-019, ¶ 2, 280 P.3d 283, 284.
56. Id.
57. Chatterjee v. King, 2011-NMCA-012, ¶ 40, 253 P.3d 915, 928.
58. Id. ¶ 29, 253 P.3d at 924-25.
59. Id. ¶¶ 27, 29, 253 P.3d at 924-25.
60. NMSA 1978, § 40-4-9.1(K) (1999) (“When any person other than a natural or
adoptive parent seeks custody of a child, no such person shall be awarded custody
absent a showing of unfitness of the natural or adoptive parent.”); In re Adoption of
J.J.B., 119 N.M. 638, 652, 894 P.2d 994, 1008 (1995) (holding that, despite the public
policy in New Mexico as demonstrated by Section 40-9-9.1(K), when “[c]ustody based
upon the biological parent-child relationship [is] at odds with the best interests of the
child must prevail” and that “[a] parent’s right is not absolute and under extraordinary circumstances, custody of a child may be awarded to a non[-]parent over the
objections of a parent.”); Chatterjee, 2011-NMCA-012, ¶ 49, 253 P.3d 915, 930 (Vigil,
J. dissenting).
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court to determine whether visitation with Chatterjee would be in Alliya’s best interest.61 On remand, the district court appointed a guardian
ad litem for Alliya and accepted the guardian ad litem’s recommendation
that, pending appeal, contact and visitation with Chatterjee would be in
Alliya’s best interests.62 Chatterjee appealed to the New Mexico Supreme
Court; the court granted certiorari on January 27, 2011.63 The New Mexico Supreme Court held that the petitioner had standing to bring an action to establish a parent and child relationship with the child pursuant to
the UPA because the petitioner alleged sufficient facts to establish that
she was a presumed natural parent under the Act.64
C. Reasoning of the New Mexico Supreme Court
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61. Chatterjee, 2011-NMCA-012, ¶¶ 39, 40, 253 P.3d 915, 928.
62. Chatterjee, 2012-NMSC-019, ¶ 3, 280 P.3d 283, 285; Brief for Petitioner at 6,
Chatterjee, 2012-NMSC-019, 280 P.3d 283 (No. 32–789) (“During the remand regarding interim visitation, the Court of Appeals continued to exercise concurrent jurisdiction on the merits.” Chatterjee appealed after the court of appeals ultimately held
that Chatterjee was not a parent under the UPA because the presumptions of paternity do not apply to women.).
63. Chatterjee, 2011-NMCA-012, ¶ 40, 253 P.3d 915, 928.
64. Chatterjee, 2012-NMSC-019, ¶ 5, 280 P.3d 283, 285; NMSA 1978, § 40-11-21
(2004).
65. Chatterjee, 2012-NMSC-019, ¶ 52, 280 P.3d 283, 297; NMSA 1978, § 40-115(A)(4) (2004) (“A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if: (4) while
the child is under the age of majority, he openly holds out the child as his natural child
and has established a personal, financial or custodial relationship with the child.”).
66. Chatterjee, 2012-NMSC-019, ¶ 52, 280 P.3d 283, 297.
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In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Chávez, the New Mexico
Supreme Court held that Chatterjee had standing to bring an action to
establish a parent and child relationship with Alliya pursuant to Section
40-11-21 because Chatterjee alleged sufficient facts to establish that she
was a presumed natural parent under Section 40-11-5(A)(4).65 The New
Mexico Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded the
case to the district court.66
The court reasoned Chatterjee had standing because: (1) the plain
language of the UPA instructs courts to apply Section 40-11-5(A)(4) to
women because it is practicable for a woman to hold a child out as her
own by, among other things, providing full-time emotional and financial
support for the child; (2) commentary by the drafters of the UPA supports applying provisions related to determining paternity to the determination of maternity; (3) the court’s approach is consistent with the way
courts in other jurisdictions have interpreted statutes similar to New
Mexico’s UPA; and (4) New Mexico’s public policy encourages the sup-
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port of children, financial and otherwise, by providers willing and able to
care for the child.67 This note will examine each one of these analytical
paths in more detail.
1. Plain Language
Analyzing Section 40-11-2 for its plain meaning, the court held that
Section 40-11-5(A)(4) applied to both men and women.68 The supreme
court disagreed with the court of appeals’ conclusion that it was impracticable to use Section 40-11-5(A)(4) to prove maternity.69 Instead, the court
reasoned it was practicable to apply Section 40-11-5 to determine maternity in certain circumstances.70 The court reasoned that a woman is capable of holding out a child as her natural child and establishing a personal,
financial, or custodial relationship with that child because the parental
presumption is based on a person’s conduct, not a biological connection.71
After concluding that the plain meaning of the statute can apply to two
mothers, the court moved on to legislative intent.
2. Legislative Intent
Upon analyzing the drafters’ intent,72 the court noted that the authors of the original UPA, anticipating situations like the one in this case,
provided in a comment that masculine terminology was used for the sake
of simplicity and not to limit application of its provisions to males.73 The
court analyzed the comment to the 2001 model UPA, which states:
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67. Id. ¶ 5, 280 P.3d at 285.
68. New Mexico has codified a Uniform Statute and Rule Construction Act and
authorizes plain meaning statutory construction under NMSA 1978, Section 12-2A-18
(1997).
69. Chatterjee, 2012-NMSC-019, ¶ 14, 280 P.3d 283, 287; § 40-11-5(A)(4) (“When
any person other than a natural or adoptive parent seeks custody of a child, no such
person shall be awarded custody absent a showing of unfitness of the natural or adoptive parent.”).
70. Chatterjee, 2012-NMSC-019, ¶ 15, 280 P.3d 283, 287-88.
71. Id.
72. New Mexico’s Uniform Statute and Rule Construction Act codifies legislative
intent as a method of statutory constructions under NMSA 1978, § 12-2A-20(C)
(1997).
73. Chatterjee, 2012-NMSC-019, ¶ 19, 280 P.3d 283, 288-89.
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This Section permits the declaration of the mother and child relationship where that is in dispute. Since it is not believed that cases
of this nature will arise frequently, Sections 4 to 20 are written
principally in terms of ascertainment of paternity. While it is obvious that certain provisions in these Sections would not apply in an
action to establish the mother and child relationship, the Commit-
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tee decided not to burden these—already complex—provisions
with references to the ascertainment of maternity. In any given
case, a judge facing a claim for the determination of the mother
and child relationship should have little difficulty deciding which
portions of Sections 4 to 20 should be applied.74

The court noted that the comment to the Model UPA does not specifically narrow the application of the action to biological maternity or paternity in establishing a parent and child relationship.75 The court held that
the commentary from the original UPA, together with the explicit instruction given in Section 40-11-21 (which provides that the paternity provisions may apply as far as practicable to establish natural motherhood),
indicate that the Legislature intended Section 40-11-5(A)(4) to apply to
both men and women.76
3. Application in Other Jurisdictions with Statutes Similar to the
New Mexico UPA
The court examined how other states with statutes virtually identical
to the New Mexico UPA have applied provisions relating to the father
and child relationship to mother and child relationships.77 The California
Supreme Court held that it is practicable to apply the “hold-out” provision of the California Uniform Parentage Act to women in varying factual situations similar to that in Chatterjee.78 Moreover, the court noted
that the Colorado Court of Appeals also interpreted the Colorado Uniform Parentage Act as enabling language applicable to the paternity provisions to be applied to women.79 Finally, the court also recognized that
the Oregon Court of Appeals extended the parentage presumption to
similarly situated women.80 The court’s analysis of other statutes led it to

02/11/2014 12:56:22
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74. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (1973) § 21 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 494 (2001).
75. Chatterjee, 2012-NMSC-019, ¶ 20, 280 P.3d 283, 289. See UNIF. PARENTAGE
ACT § 21 cmt. (1973).
76. Chatterjee, 2012-NMSC-019, ¶ 20, 280 P.3d 283, 289.
77. Id. The New Mexico Legislature made interpretation of New Mexico legislation through analysis of similar or identical statutes in other jurisdictions an interpretive canon through Section 12-2A-20(B)(2).
78. Chatterjee, 2012-NMSC-019, ¶ 21, 280 P.3d 283, 289 (citing Elisa B. v. Superior
Court, 117 P.3d 660, 666–67 (Cal. 2005)).
79. Chatterjee, 2012-NMSC-019, ¶ 20, 280 P.3d 283, 289 (“Insofar as practicable,
the provisions of [the Colorado Uniform Parentage Act] applicable to the father and
child relationship apply.”) (citing In re Bryan D., 199 Cal.App.4th 127, 130
Cal.Rptr.3d 821, 830-31 (2011)).
80. Chatterjee, 2012-NMSC-019, ¶ 28, 280 P.3d 283, 291 (recognizing that in Shineovich & Kemp, 214 P.3d 29, 39–40 (Ore. 2009), “the Oregon Court of Appeals held
that a statute recognizing a husband’s parentage based on his consent to assisted re-
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address the public policy consequences of applying a strict gender-specific
definition to presumed parents under the New Mexico UPA.81
4. Public Policy Considerations: Gender-Neutral Definition of
Parents under UPA
The court reasoned that, consistent with the underlying policy-based
rationale82 of the New Mexico UPA, equality in child welfare required
laws that achieved equality in parentage.83 Therefore, Alliya’s need for
love and support was no less critical simply because her second parent
happened to be a woman.84 The court highlighted how experts in child
psychology recognize that sometimes the law is too limiting when it
comes to actually addressing what is in a child’s best interests.85 Thus, the
court held it was inappropriate to deny Chatterjee the opportunity to establish parentage, when denying Chatterjee this opportunity would only
serve to harm Alliya.86 Essentially, the court found that the child’s best
interests are served when loving parents physically, emotionally, and financially support the child from the time the child comes into their lives.87
D. Concurring Opinion
Justice Bosson authored a concurring opinion, agreeing with the
outcome reached by the majority but arguing for a decision on narrower
grounds.88 Justice Bosson sought to limit the reach of the case to prevent
someone not recognized as a parent by the child or the child’s family
from coming into a child’s life at a much later date and claiming presumed parentage.89 Justice Bosson’s ultimate concern was that a biological mother would be forced into a “custody battle to retain control over
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production was unconstitutional unless it was equally applied to women in same-sex
relationships who consent to their partners’ inseminations.”).
81. Chatterjee, 2012-NMSC-019, ¶ 34, 280 P.3d 283, 292.
82. New Mexico’s Uniform Statute and Rule Construction Act requires statutes
to be construed to avoid an unconstitutional or absurd result. NMSA 1978, § 12-2A18(A)(3) (1997).
83. Chatterjee, 2012-NMSC-019, ¶ 34, 280 P.3d 283, 292.
84. Id.
85. Id. (“The attachment bonds that form between a child and a parent are
formed regardless of a biological or legal connection.”).
86. Id. ¶ 37, 280 P.3d at 293.
87. Id.
88. Id. ¶ 54, 280 P.3d at 297 (Bosson, R., concurring).
89. Id. ¶ 55, 280 P.3d at 297 (Bosson, J., concurring) (“[W]hen is a nonadoptive,
nonbiological individual a presumed parent under the holding-out provision of the
UPA? Then, when does biology (the lack of a biological relationship) rebut such a
presumption of parentage?”).
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her own children.”90 His concern was based entirely on the scenario of a
“hypothetical man” entering the picture, living with a woman and her
children, and later claiming parentage while asking for custody.91 Alternatively, Justice Bosson also raised the scenario in which the same hypothetical man might have presumed parentage claimed against him by the
mother seeking child support.92 Justice Bosson’s concurrence raises constitutional and public policy concerns that are central to this note’s analysis, and this note will address them separately below.
IV. ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS
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90. Id. ¶ 58, 280 P.3d at 297-98 (Bosson, J., concurring).
91. Id. ¶ 57, 280 P.3d at 297 (Bosson, J., concurring) (The hypothetical presented
by Justice Bosson is as follows: After the separation with, or death, of the children’s
biological father, “Mother begins a serious relationship with a hypothetical Man who
moves in and lives happily with Mother and her two young children. Man assists in
financial aspects of the household, which almost automatically includes expenses that
support the children. . . . After a few years, however, the relationship sours, and
Mother asks Man to leave. . . . Man decides he does not want it to end entirely; he
wants to share legal custody over the two children.”).
92. Id. ¶ 59, 280 P.3d at 298 (Bosson, J., concurring).
93. See ABRAMS, supra note 6, at 278–79.
94. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
95. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
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By using a gender-neutral approach to define parents under the
UPA, the court in Chatterjee shifted the custody analysis away from a
gender-specific approach to one focused on the best interests of the
child—the original intent behind the UPA.93 The concurring opinion by
Justice Bosson raises concerns about whether applying a broad holdingout provision under the UPA is sound constitutionally or as a matter of
public policy. Justice Bosson’s hypothetical man highlights how a very
broad holding-out provision undermines the rights of biological parents.94
However, a broad, gender-neutral definition of parentage (as articulated
by the majority in Chatterjee) is constitutionally limited to a person already acting as a functional parent for the child rather than any third
party asserting a presumed parental right.95
The following analysis addresses Justice Bosson’s concerns and supports the majority’s holding through an alternative reasoning approach
supported by: (a) substantive due process; (b) equal protection; and (c)
public policy goals of the UPA that acknowledge the emotional and psychological bonds a child creates with a presumed parent. This section
evaluates the court’s opinion and discusses whether substantive due process and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment re-
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quired the gender-neutral analysis in Chatterjee. Finally, this section
evaluates the public policy benefits of a gender-neutral construction of
“parent” under the UPA and the implications of such an application.
A. Constitutional Hurdles
It is a well-established principle of statutory construction that a statute should be construed, if possible, to avoid constitutional questions.96 If
a statute is subject to two interpretations, one supporting its constitutionality and the other rendering it void, the court should adopt the interpretation that will uphold it.97 Declining to construe the UPA in a genderneutral manner—one that affords a child two parents of the same sex—
discriminates against putative parents based on their gender, denies gay
and lesbian partners equal parenting rights and responsibilities vis-à-vis
heterosexual partners, and denies children of same-sex partners the care
and support of two lawful parents.98 The lack of any rational justification
for employing a non-gender-neutral interpretation inhibits courts from
fulfilling constitutional guarantees. Thus, the gender-neutral construction
of the New Mexico UPA the court employs in Chatterjee adheres to longstanding constitutional principles of both equal protection and substantive due process.
1. Substantive Due Process
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96. Lovelace Medical Center v. Mendez, 111 N.M. 336, 340, 805 P.2d 603, 607
(1991).
97. Huey v. Lente, 85 N.M. 597, 598, 514 P.2d 1093, 1094 (1973).
98. Although a gender-specific reading of the New Mexico UPA has a discriminatory impact upon same-sex couples, it is only facially discriminatory on the basis of
gender. Absent any discriminatory legislative intent on the basis of sexual orientation,
an equal protection and substantive due process analysis only applies to gender
discrimination.
99. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
100. Troxel, 530 U.S. 57 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)).
101. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702.
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The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall “deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”99 The
U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause “guarantees more than fair process.”100 The
Due Process Clause has a substantive component that “provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.”101
For more than eighty-five years, the U.S. Supreme Court has held
that the Due Process Clause protects the right of parents to “establish a
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home and bring up children” and “to control the education of their own
[children].”102 In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Court held that the “liberty of parents and guardians” includes the right “to direct the upbringing
and education of children under their control.”103 The Court explained
that “[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture
him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty to
recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.”104 The Court reaffirmed this principle in Prince v. Massachusetts by confirming that “[i]t is
cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first
in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation
for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.”105
The procedural history of Chatterjee evidences considerable debate
on the issue of a biological mother’s substantive due process rights.106
Both Chatterjee and King addressed their respective substantive due process rights by applying Troxel v. Granville, the last case the U.S. Supreme
Court heard regarding parents’ substantive due process rights against
third parties in child visitation proceedings.107 Although the majority
opinion never addresses Troxel, or substantive due process for that matter, the concurring opinion uses its hypothetical man example in a clear
attempt to draw a scenario that may threaten a biological mother’s constitutional rights.
In Troxel, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a “breathtakingly
broad” Washington visitation statute that permitted any person to seek
visitation at any time based on the best interests of the child.108 The
mother in Troxel desired to limit her children’s visitation with the parents
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102. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401 (1923).
103. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).
104. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534 (emphasis added).
105. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). See Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (“It is plain that the interest of a parent in the companionship,
care, custody, and management of his or her children ‘come[s] to this Court with a
momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely
from shifting economic arrangements.’ ” (citation omitted)); Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499–508 (1977) (“This Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A host of cases,
tracing lineage to Meyer . . . have consistently acknowledged a ‘private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.’ ”).
106. See Chatterjee v. King, 2012-NMSC-019, ¶ 2, 280 P.3d 283, 284-85; Brief for
Petitioner at 43-44; Answer Brief for Respondent at 44-45; Reply Brief for Petitioner
at 18.
107. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
108. Id. at 67.
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109. Id. at 61.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 68.
113. Id. at 85.
114. Id. at 72–73.
115. ABRAMS, supra note 6, at 278.
116. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 88–89 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
117. Id.; Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976)
(“Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one
attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by
the Constitution and have constitutional rights.”).
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of their deceased father, a man to whom she was never married.109 The
paternal grandparents invoked a Washington statute that permitted any
person to petition to the superior court for visitation rights of any child at
any time and that gave discretion to the court to grant visitation when in
the best interest of the children, without regard to any change in circumstances.110 The U.S. Supreme Court recognized that courts may award visitation or custody to persons other than a child’s legal parents so long as
there are “special factors” that warrant doing so.111 The Supreme Court
explained that the statute was unconstitutional as applied because there
were no “special factors that might justify the State’s interference with” a
parent’s childrearing decisions.112 The majority indicated that, in contrast
to the claim before them, they would look favorably at a visitation and/or
custody claim from a de facto parent or a person with a substantial relationship to the child.113 In a plurality opinion, Troxel affirmed the Washington Supreme Court’s invalidation of a state statute because the Due
Process Clause does not permit a state to “infringe on the fundamental
right of parents to make child rearing decisions simply because a state
judge believes a “better” decision could be made.”114 Accordingly, Troxel
recognized the parent’s fundamental right to direct his or her children’s
care, custody, and control, and it impliedly rejected the substitution of a
judge’s opinion that a particular child would be better raised in a situation a trial judge prefers.115
Additionally, Justice Stevens, in his dissent to Troxel, argued that
the child’s voice is an important third-party voice often missing in custody
disputes.116 Similarly, in Chatterjee, had the court taken a gender-specific
analysis, children would be peculiarly absent in future custody standing
determinations. Children and their parents both have a protected fundamental interest in the preservation of a strong familial relationship.117
N.M. Const. art. II, section 4 provides:
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All persons are born equally free, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, among which are the rights of enjoying
and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and of seeking and obtaining safety and
happiness.118
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118. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 4 (emphasis added).
119. See State v. Booken, 19 N.M. 404, 143 P. 479, 481 (1914); State v. Sutton, 112
N.M. 449, 455, 816 P.2d 518, 524 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Vickery, 85 N.M. 389, 396,
512 P.2d 962, 969 (Ct. App. 1973).
120. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 3; IOWA CONST. art. I,
§ 1; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 1; N.J. CONST. art. I, ¶ 1; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 1; OHIO
CONST. art. I, § 1; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 1; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3.
121. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (holding that “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.”); Joseph R. Grodin, Rediscovering the
State Constitutional Right to Happiness and Safety, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 27-28
(1997/1998) (“Whereas “privacy” connotes bounded individual protection, “happiness,” or “happiness and safety” points more in the direction of an individual’s relationship to others.”).
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This provision, generally referred to as the “safety and happiness” clause,
is a state constitutional right that courts should recognize as a fundamental right because courts use the term “fundamental right” to determine
the level of scrutiny to employ under state law when assessing a penalty
on the exercise of the right. In fact, New Mexico appellate courts have
already indicated that the safety and happiness clause is judicially enforceable.119 Numerous other state constitutions contain some variation of
these inherent rights.120 These inherent rights provisions provide protections for interests in personhood that are distinct from notions of privacy
grounded in the federal penumbras and are crucial to substantive due
process analysis.121
A gender-neutral reading of the New Mexico UPA protects the substantive due process rights of all affected parties similar to those in Chatterjee. Although Justice Bosson’s concurring opinion warns of the dangers
of the hypothetical man, a gender-neutral reading of the New Mexico
UPA reaches a different conclusion than Troxel. Instead, a gender-neutral reading of the New Mexico UPA secures the constitutional rights of
the biological, natural, or presumed parent, as well as of the child. Unlike
in Troxel, in which the child’s mother never encouraged a bond with a
parental figure, Chatterjee and King shared an abundance of parental duties. King faced a custody dispute with a person already acting as a de
facto parent. This distinction is important because the circumstances
presented in Chatterjee limit the scope of the potential parties who can
submit custody claims to those acting as de facto parents. Therefore, the
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argument that a gender-neutral construction of the UPA limits the
mother’s freedom is unpersuasive in this case because she is the one who
invited the “hypothetical parent” to form the bond with the child.122
Under the safety and happiness clause, both parents and the child have a
right to form intimate relationships.123 Removing such a right through a
gender-specific construction violates the safety and happiness clause and
substantive due process.124
Additionally, it is important to note that the New Mexico Legislature’s recent recodification of the New Mexico UPA further narrowed the
UPA’s scope.125 While Chatterjee employs a broadened gender-neutral
construction of the UPA, the recodification narrows its application by demanding that a presumed parent asserting the holding-out provision of
the UPA must have lived with the child for the first two years of the
child’s life. These constructions, by both Chatterjee and the UPA recodification, still distinguish New Mexico’s application of the UPA from the
overly broad statute in Troxel, which permitted “any interested party” to
assert visiting rights with the child as long as that person served the best
interest of the child in any direct or indirect form.126 The recodification of
the UPA would not have affected Chatterjee’s holding because, unlike
Troxel, presumed parents in same-sex households already operate as
functional families.127 Chatterjee lived with Alliya from the day she was
adopted and presented numerous examples in which she participated
within the functional family of King, Alliya, and herself.128 Thus, a gen-
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122. See Barbara B. Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective
on Parents’ Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747, 1846-47 (1993).
123. See Trujillo v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 768 F.2d 1186, 1190 (10th Cir. 1985)
(holding that a sister had a right to intimate association with her sibling, and could
bring a Section 1983 claim for deprivation of that right).
124. James G. Dwyer, A Taxonomy of Children’s Existing Rights in State Decision
Making about Their Relationships, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 845, 846-47 (2003).
125. NMSA 1978, § 40-11A-204(A)(5) (2009) (A man is presumed to be the father
under the UPA when “for the first two years of the child’s life, he resided in the same
household with the child as his own.”).
126. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 77–78 (2000).
127. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Stageman v. City of
Ann Arbor, 540 N.W.2d 724, 725 (Mich. App. 1995) (“functional family means a
group of no more than 6 people plus their offspring, having a relationship which is
functionally equivalent to a family. The relationship must be of a permanent and distinct character with a demonstrable and recognizable bond characteristic of a cohesive
unit. Functional family does not include a society, club, fraternity, sorority, association, lodge, organization or group of students or other individuals where the common
living arrangement or basis for the establishment of the housekeeping unit is temporary.”) (quoting Ann Arbor Code § 5.7(4)).
128. Moore, 431 U.S. 494.
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der-neutral reading of the UPA secures the substantive due process rights
of the biological, natural, or presumed parent, as well the child.
2. Equal Protection
The Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution guarantees all
individuals equal protection under the law.129 Article II, section 18 of the
New Mexico Constitution is effectively the state equivalent of the Equal
Protection Clause.130 The nature and importance of individual interests
and the governmental purpose behind statutorily created classification
determine the applicable standard of review under the Equal Protection
Clause in a specific case.131 Under the New Mexico Equal Rights Amendment, sex-based classifications are suspect and therefore subject to strict
or intermediate scrutiny.132 The New Mexico Equal Rights Amendment
guarantees that “[e]quality of rights under law shall not be denied on
account of the sex of any person” and requires the court to read the UPA
to allow women to establish parentage in the same manners provided to
men, and vice-versa.133 “Equal protection, both federal and state, guarantees that the government will treat individuals similarly situated in an
equal manner.”134 “New Mexico’s constitution requires the State to pro-
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129. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
130. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 18 (“Equality of rights under law shall not be denied on
account of the sex of any person.”).
131. Mieras v. Dyncorp, 1996-NMCA-095, ¶ 24, 925 P.2d 518, 525.
132. “There are three levels of equal protection review based on the New Mexico
Constitution: rational basis review, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny.” Breen
v. Carlsbad Mun. Sch., 2005-NMSC-028, ¶ 11, 120 P.3d 413, 418 (“Rational basis review applies to general social and economic legislation that does not affect a fundamental or important constitutional right or a suspect or sensitive class. This standard
of review is the most deferential to the constitutionality of the legislation and the
burden is on the party challenging the legislation to prove that it is not rationally
related to a legitimate governmental purpose. . . . Strict scrutiny requires the most
exacting review by a court. Only legislation that affects the exercise of a fundamental
right or a suspect classification such as race or ancestry will be subject to strict scrutiny. . . . [I]ntermediate scrutiny is more probing than rational basis but less so than
strict scrutiny. Like strict scrutiny, the burden is on the party supporting the legislation to prove the constitutionality of the legislation; however, the party must only
prove that the classification or discrimination caused by the legislation is substantially
related to an important government interest. This standard of review has been previously applied to classifications based on gender and illegitimacy.”) (citations omitted).
133. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 18.
134. Breen, 2005-NMSC-028, ¶ 7, 120 P.3d 413, 417 (citing N.M. CONST. art. II,
§ 18).
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vide a compelling justification for using classifications to the disadvantage
of the persons they classify.”135
While sex-based classifications receive intermediate or strict scrutiny, the court has acknowledged that “not all classifications based on
physical characteristics unique to one sex are instances of invidious discrimination.”136 Men and women, however, can still be similarly situated
for the purposes of equal protection analysis where a law makes classifications using sex-based physical characteristics.137 Consequently, New
Mexico’s equal protection analysis requires the court to look beyond the
classification to the purpose of the law to determine whether men and
women are similarly situated.138 Specifically, “to determine whether a
classification based on a physical characteristic unique to one sex results
in the denial of equality of rights under law within the meaning of New
Mexico’s Equal Rights Amendment, [the court] must ascertain whether
the classification operates to the disadvantage of persons so classified.”139
A gender-specific reading of the New Mexico UPA is facially discriminatory140 on the basis of sex. Therefore, under both strict and intermediate scrutiny, the UPA’s sex-based classification is presumptively
unconstitutional, and it is the government’s burden to prove that the law
is either (1) narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest; or (2) substantially related to an important government interest.141
Failing to adopt a gender-neutral interpretation of the UPA violates
equal protection, as it constitutes discrimination based on gender. Two
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135. New Mexico Right to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson, 1999-NMSC-005, ¶ 43, 975
P.2d 841, 855.
136. Johnson, 1999-NMSC-005, ¶ 38, 975 P.2d 841, 854.
137. Id. ¶ 39, 975 P.2d at 854 (“It is equally erroneous to rely on the notion that a
classification based on a unique physical characteristic is reasonable simply because it
corresponds to some ‘natural’ grouping.”).
138. Id.
139. Id. ¶ 40, 975 P.2d at 854.
140. A facially discriminatory classification draws a distinction among people
based on a particular characteristic that exists on the face of the law. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 718–19 (3d ed. 2009). Alternatively, a facially neutral
law does not draw a distinction among people based on a particular characteristic, but
may have discriminatory impacts or effects and, thus, require a heightened burden to
prove that there is a discriminatory purpose behind the law. Id.
141. See Breen v. Carlsbad Mun. Sch., 2005-NMSC-028, ¶ 13, 120 P.3d 413, 418;
Johnson, 1999-NMSC-005, ¶¶ 36-37, 975 P.2d 841, 853 (holding that strict scrutiny
applies to laws that implicate the reproductive rights of women: “Although we recognize that federal courts currently apply an intermediate level of scrutiny to genderbased classifications, our rationale for conducting a searching judicial inquiry regarding such classifications under the New Mexico Constitution may accord with the criteria for invoking more stringent judicial scrutiny under federal law.”).
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142. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
143. Chatterjee v. King, 2012-NMSC-019, ¶ 18, 280 P.3d 283, 288 (The New Mexico
Supreme Court noted this exact contradiction: “If this Court interpreted Section 4011-5(A)(4) as applying only to males, then a man in a same sex relationship claiming
to be a natural parent because he held out a child as his own would have standing
simply by virtue of his gender, while a woman in the same position would not. In
other words, if two men were in Chatterjee’s and King’s exact situation, Chatterjee’s
male counterpart would have standing under Section 40-11-5(A)(4) of the UPA to
establish parentage, while Chatterjee would not.”).
144. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Brown v. Bd.
of Ed. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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similarly situated heterosexual parents who have a child encounter no
difficulties regarding eligibility for lawful parentage under Section 4011A-201 of the UPA. For lesbian partners, however, reading the UPA in a
gender-specific manner always precludes one parent from establishing
even the consideration of legal parentage eligibility. In other words, strict
gender-specific readings always leave one lesbian parent unprotected
under the UPA on the basis of gender and nothing more. If Chatterjee
and King were both men, Chatterjee could have easily established parentage, because a gender-specific UPA only applies the presumption of parentage factors to fathers. Under a gender-specific application of the UPA,
one or both presumed lesbian parents would become “a stranger to [the]
laws” that easily apply to similarly situated heterosexual or male samesex parents.142 This contradicting result, which bars lesbian partners from
attaining lawful parenthood, stems solely from a strict gender-based interpretation of the UPA.143 Therefore, absent any compelling justification
for such gender-based discrimination, a gender-specific construction of
the UPA violates the Equal Protection Clause.
Finally, adopting a gender-based interpretation of the New Mexico
UPA violates equal protection because it disadvantages children based
solely on the circumstances of their birth. This method denies a child of
same-sex partners the emotional and financial benefits of a second lawful
parent to which children born to heterosexual couples are entitled. With
respect to fundamental rights, equal protection directly outlaws unequal
treatment solely based on circumstances of birth.144 A gender-specific
reading of the UPA discriminates against a particular class of children
simply because the two people raising and caring for those children are of
the same gender. Alternatively, a gender-neutral reading and application
of the UPA increases the likelihood that children will receive the same
benefits regardless of their parents’ gender because the law supports two
legally defined presumptive parents. Therefore, a gender-specific construction of the UPA violates equal protection while a gender-neutral
reading does not.
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B. Public Policy
The Legislature developed the UPA with the intent of protecting the
rights and legal interests of children as well as those of putative parents.145
A gender-specific construction of the UPA is counterintuitive to this goal
as the makeup of “traditional families” is changing.146 Our society no
longer features strictly biological families born to heterosexual couples.147
A gender-neutral approach to defining parents must prevail in order to
facilitate the legal identity of parents and the definition of families. The
law must legitimize families without absolute deference to biological ties,
presumed gender roles, living arrangements, or the timing of the initiation of the parent-child relationship.148 Functional families149 in New Mexico can only prevail with an approach that incorporates a child-centered
analysis into the definition of a parent-child relationship under the
UPA.150 Rather than restricting parentage by biology or gender roles, the
law must acknowledge that children create deep parent-child relationships beyond the confines of biology, genetics, or heterosexuality.151
To avoid the historically harsh results found at common law, the
court correctly decided Chatterjee using a gender-neutral definition of
parentage. A gender-neutral definition allows enough flexibility so that
the law gives the same protection to all families, including those that are
based on something other than biology or marriage. A child-centered approach, regardless of the parents’ gender or sexuality, allows courts to
consider the relationships that make up the family over the form of the
family.152 In addition, the law must recognize parents not by their genetic
contribution to the child’s creation or either parent’s gender, but rather
for their emotional, psychological, and financial contributions to the
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145. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 2 cmt. (1973) (amended 2000), 9B U.L.A. 390
(2001).
146. See THE WILLIAMS INSTITUTE, supra note 1.
147. See id.
148. Leslie J. Harris, Reconsidering the Criteria for Legal Fatherhood, 1996 UTAH
L. REV. 461, 474 (1996).
149. NMSA 1978, § 40-15-3(A) (2005) (“It is the policy of the state that its laws
and programs shall support intact, functional families and promote each family’s ability and responsibility to raise its children.”).
150. See Woodhouse, supra note 122, at 1753.
151. See Mary R. Anderlik & Mark A. Rothstein, DNA-Based Identity Testing and
the Future of the Family: A Research Agenda, 28 AM. J. L. & MED. 225 (2002)
(Bioethicist Thomas Murray says “policy across domains should be informed by the
recognition that ‘the flourishing of parents and children is intertwined; that by doing
what is loving for the children, parents experience profound satisfactions and develop
virtues that promote their own flourishing as well.’ ”).
152. Dwyer, supra note 124, at 846-47.
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child.153 Instead of discounting the non-traditional family, parentage laws
should be flexible enough to acknowledge non-traditional parent-child
relationships. Adopting a child-centered approach through a gender-neutral application of the UPA allows courts to consider relationships over
biology. The UPA was created for this specific purpose—to end the mistreatment of children the law once deemed illegitimate by providing them
the security of emotional and financial health.154
The most important moral requirement at stake here is that adults
care and provide for their children. Morality does not require that those
children be the adults’ biological offspring. Instead, laws that base parental rights and duties on biological relationship alone are notably less effective at inducing responsible behavior.155 The common-law notion of
child custody rights was rooted in presumptions of morality, yet it led to
absurd historical results that left illegitimate children as defenseless victims.156 Therefore, public policy demands a departure from the antiquated
laws that produce harsh results for children and parents alike. This departure requires that a parent’s relationship with the child become the focal
point in child custody disputes.157
C. Implications
Chatterjee does leave the courts and lawyers in New Mexico with
some uncertainty about what acts by a presumed parent satisfy the UPA’s
holding-out provision.158 Subsequent cases need to apply a case-by-case
analysis to determine whether presumed parents, regardless of sexuality,
truly “held out” the child as their own.159 This process may appear to im-
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153. Harris, supra note 148, at 480.
154. Nolan, supra note 13, at 6; see also ABRAMS, supra note 6, at 278.
155. Harris, supra note 148, at 485.
156. Id.
157. See Katherine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The
Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of a Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA.
L. REV. 879, 951 (1984); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries,
81 VA. L. REV. 2401, 2450 (1995).
158. Chatterjee v. King, 2012-NMSC-019, ¶ 1, 280 P.3d 283, 284 (Neither the New
Mexico Court of Appeals nor the New Mexico Supreme Court included the majority
of the facts present in court filings by Chatterjee or King).
159. Cases after Chatterjee will need to further define the holding-out provision, as
have the California cases following Elisa B. v. Super. Ct., 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005), in
which California broadened its UPA to acknowledge same-sex parents. See, e.g., L.M.
v. M.G., 145 Cal. Rptr. 3d 97 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2012) (holding that an adoptive
mother’s single-parent adoption decree did not conclusively rebut a same-sex cohabitant’s UPA presumption of maternity, nor did the cohabitant’s UPA presumption of
maternity require the court to weigh any conflicting claims or presumptions of maternity); S.Y. v. S.B., 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 11 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. 2011) (holding that the
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pede judicial efficiency, as the courts will need to examine every aspect of
the parent-child relationship; but over time, more accurate determinations of parentage in child custody disputes will benefit New Mexico’s
children. Emphasizing accuracy over efficiency through a case-by-case
gender-neutral application of the UPA will protect the rights of children
and the rights of their presumptive parents.
V. CONCLUSION
Chatterjee v. King is the first case to highlight the challenges inherent in applying the UPA to same-sex family custody disputes: equal protection, substantive due process, and public policy issues that required a
redefinition of the term “parent” under the law. Child custody disputes
between unmarried same-sex partners who have lived together intimately
and have brought children into the relationship are becoming more
prominent every year. Without dissolution of marriage laws applicable to
same-sex couples, children and presumptive parents’ rights will undoubtedly benefit from the New Mexico Supreme Court’s gender-neutral construction of the UPA in Chatterjee. The makeup of traditional families is
changing, and Chatterjee helps New Mexico attorneys and judges facilitate a change to a more comprehensive custody determination: one more
focused on the best interests of the child and the rights of presumed parents than on strict gender-role constructions.
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presumed mother met the burden of the holding-out provision by: (1) telling the natural mother she would co-parent a child with the natural mother, (2) sharing the cost of
in vitro fertilization, (3) accompanying the natural mother to the hospital to give birth
to the children, (4) sharing the home with the natural mother and the children, (5) the
natural mother allowed the presumed mother to care for the children, (6) the natural
mother encouraged the children to visit with the presumed mother’s family in another
state, (7) the presumed mother worked with the children in their classroom, and (8)
the presumed mother provided financially for the children and even set up college
savings accounts for the children); In re Bryan D., 130 Cal. Rptr. 3d 821, 831 (Cal.
App. 2d Dist. 2011) (holding that a grandmother could not be deemed a child’s presumed mother even though she brought the child into her home because evidence
indicated that the child referred to the grandmother as his grandmother; the child also
still visited with his biological mother and referred to her as his mother.); Scott v.
Super. Ct., 89 Cal. Rptr. 3d 843, 847 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. 2009) (holding that the biological father’s former live-in girlfriend could not be a presumed mother under the
UPA, absent evidence that the children’s biological mother’s parental rights were terminated or that there was an action pending to terminate her parental rights).

